
Preface
In 2025, while ransomware continued to dominate headlines, a significant portion of cyber intrusions were driven by non-ransomware malware. These malware families played a critical role in initial access, credential theft, persistence, and post-compromise control. Often operating silently, they enabled attackers to stay undetected for long periods while harvesting sensitive data and maintaining footholds.
Top 25 Malware Families
1.QakBot (QBot)
QakBot evolved from a traditional banking trojan into a powerful loader and access broker. In 2025, it was widely used to distribute secondary payloads, harvest credentials, and profile enterprise environments before further exploitation.
2.IcedID
IcedID remained a stealthy initial access malware, commonly delivered via phishing emails and malicious documents. It often acted as a reconnaissance tool, gathering system and network information before deploying follow-on malware.
3.Emotet
Despite repeated disruptions, Emotet resurfaced as a modular malware delivery platform. Rather than acting alone, it primarily served as a distribution channel for other malware families.
4.TrickBot
TrickBot continued to function as a credential harvester and reconnaissance malware. It was frequently observed gathering system details and authentication material to support larger attack campaigns.
5.AsyncRAT
AsyncRAT retained popularity due to its open-source nature and flexibility. It enabled remote access, keystroke logging, screen capture, and data exfiltration across compromised systems.
6.RedLine Stealer
RedLine Stealer was one of the most prevalent infostealers in 2025. It targeted browser credentials, VPN access, cryptocurrency wallets, and session tokens, feeding large-scale access resale operations.
7.Lumma Stealer
Lumma Stealer gained traction as a stealth-focused infostealer. Often distributed through cracked software and phishing campaigns, it was valued for its fast exfiltration and low detection rate.
8.Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla remained a dominant malware in email-based attacks. It specialized in keylogging and credential theft, exfiltrating data through multiple communication channels.
9.SnakeKeylogger
SnakeKeylogger continued to succeed through simplicity. Its focus on keystroke capture and basic credential theft made it effective against poorly secured endpoints.
10.Remcos RAT
Remcos RAT was widely used for persistent remote access. Often disguised as legitimate installers, it enabled surveillance, file manipulation, and command execution.
11.XWorm
XWorm emerged as a lightweight yet capable remote access trojan. Its modular design and ease of deployment made it popular among emerging threat actors.
12.DarkGate
DarkGate stood out as a powerful malware loader. It was frequently used to deploy infostealers and establish persistence while evading traditional security controls.
13.NetSupport RAT
Originally legitimate software, NetSupport RAT was heavily abused for covert remote access. It was commonly delivered through phishing and fake software update campaigns.
14.GootLoader
GootLoader leveraged search engine optimization poisoning to lure victims. Users searching for legitimate tools were redirected to malicious JavaScript payloads, resulting in silent compromise.
15.SocGholish (FakeUpdates)
SocGholish relied on fake browser update prompts to trick users into executing malicious payloads. It was widely used as an entry point for additional malware.
16.Vidar Stealer
Vidar Stealer focused on harvesting browser data, credentials, and cryptocurrency-related information. It was often bundled with pirated software installers.
17.FormBook
FormBook remained a staple infostealer due to its reliability and low cost. It was commonly used in large-scale phishing campaigns targeting email and browser credentials.
18.Raccoon Stealer
Despite earlier leaks, Raccoon Stealer variants continued circulating in 2025. It targeted browser sessions, saved passwords, and authentication tokens.
19.NjRAT
NjRAT persisted as a basic but effective remote access trojan. It was frequently used in smaller campaigns for surveillance and system control.
20.PlugX
PlugX was associated with long-term espionage operations. It enabled persistent access, data exfiltration, and stealthy control of compromised systems.
21.Cobalt Strike (Malicious Use)
Although designed for legitimate security testing, cracked versions of Cobalt Strike were widely abused for command-and-control operations and post-compromise activity.
22.Sliver (Malicious Use)
Sliver emerged as a modern alternative to Cobalt Strike. It offered stealthy post-exploitation capabilities and was increasingly adopted by advanced threat actors.
23.AdLoad (macOS)
AdLoad continued targeting macOS environments, proving that macOS malware remained active and capable of persistence and data collection.
24.SmokeLoader
SmokeLoader functioned as a resilient delivery mechanism. It often remained dormant before deploying secondary malware, making detection difficult.
25.Latrodectus
Latrodectus gained attention in 2025 as a newer malware loader. It combined stealth, persistence, and modular payload delivery, positioning itself as a next-generation loader.
A Unified MITRE ATT&CK View of 25 Dominant Threats
Why This Matters
In 2025, most successful intrusions were not caused by ransomware, but by stealth malware operating earlier in the kill chain. These 25 malware families consistently appeared across phishing campaigns, credential-theft operations, access-broker ecosystems, and post-exploitation activity.
When analyzed together, they reveal clear ATT&CK convergence patterns: execution via users, aggressive credential harvesting, stealthy persistence, and resilient command-and-control.
Loaders & Initial Access Malware
| Malware | Primary ATT&CK Tactics & Techniques |
|---|---|
| QakBot | Phishing (T1566), User Execution (T1204), Credential Dumping (T1003), Web C2 (T1071.001) |
| IcedID | Phishing Attachment (T1566.001), Obfuscation (T1027), HTTPS C2 (T1071.001) |
| Emotet | Phishing (T1566), PowerShell (T1059.001), Lateral Movement – SMB (T1021.002) |
| TrickBot | LSASS Dumping (T1003.001), Scheduled Tasks (T1053.005), Web Services C2 (T1102) |
| GootLoader | Drive‑by Compromise (T1189), JavaScript Execution (T1059.007), Obfuscation (T1027) |
| SocGholish | Drive‑by Download (T1189), User Execution (T1204), Web C2 (T1071) |
| DarkGate | Malicious Attachments (T1566.001), Process Injection (T1055), Encrypted C2 (T1573) |
| Latrodectus | Phishing (T1566), DLL Load Hijacking (T1574), Encrypted Web C2 (T1071.001) |
Infostealers (Credential‑Focused Malware)
| Malware | Primary ATT&CK Tactics & Techniques |
|---|---|
| RedLine | Browser Credential Theft (T1555.003), Clipboard Data (T1115), C2 Exfiltration (T1041) |
| Lumma Stealer | Credential Dumping (T1555), Packed Binary (T1027), Web Exfiltration (T1041) |
| Vidar | Browser & Wallet Data Theft (T1555, T1552), HTTPS Exfiltration (T1041) |
| FormBook | Keylogging (T1056), Credential Access (T1555), HTTP/FTP Exfiltration (T1048) |
| Raccoon Stealer | Browser Data Collection (T1555), Web C2 (T1041) |
| Agent Tesla | Keylogging (T1056), Email Credential Theft (T1555), SMTP Exfiltration (T1048.003) |
| SnakeKeylogger | Keystroke Logging (T1056.001), Email Exfiltration (T1048.003) |
RATs & Persistent Access Malware
| Malware | Primary ATT&CK Tactics & Techniques |
|---|---|
| AsyncRAT | Startup Persistence (T1547), Keylogging (T1056.001), Custom TCP C2 (T1095) |
| Remcos RAT | Registry Persistence (T1547), Screen Capture (T1113), Custom C2 (T1095) |
| XWorm | PowerShell Execution (T1059.001), Scheduled Tasks (T1053), TCP C2 (T1095) |
| NetSupport RAT | User Execution (T1204), Startup Persistence (T1547), Remote Services (T1021) |
| NjRAT | Registry Persistence (T1547), Keylogging (T1056), Custom TCP C2 (T1095) |
| PlugX | DLL Hijacking (T1574.001), Signed Binary Proxy Execution (T1218), Encrypted C2 (T1573) |
| SmokeLoader | Process Injection (T1055), Obfuscation (T1027), Registry Persistence (T1547) |
Post‑Exploitation & Dual‑Use Frameworks
| Malware / Tool | Primary ATT&CK Tactics & Techniques |
|---|---|
| Cobalt Strike | PowerShell (T1059), Lateral Movement – SMB (T1021.002), HTTPS Beaconing (T1071.001) |
| Sliver | Command Execution (T1059), Service Persistence (T1543), Encrypted C2 (T1573) |
| AdLoad (macOS) | Launch Agent Persistence (T1543.001), Masquerading (T1036), Web C2 (T1071) |
What the Combined View Reveals
Dominant ATT&CK Tactics in 2025:
- Execution (TA0002): Almost always user‑triggered.
- Credential Access (TA0006): Primary monetization vector.
- Defense Evasion (TA0005): Obfuscation and process injection ubiquitous.
- Command & Control (TA0011): Encrypted, web‑based, and cloud‑friendly architectures dominate.
This confirms a critical shift:
2025 malware focused on access longevity, not immediate damage.
Malware Impact by Region — 2025 (%)
| Region | Impact (%) |
|---|---|
| North America | 38% |
| Europe | 27% |
| Asia‑Pacific (APAC) | 24% |
| Latin America | 7% |
| Middle East & Africa | 4% |
Key Facts About Malware in 2025
1. Infostealers Became the Primary Entry Currency
In 2025, stolen credentials and session tokens were traded more actively than malware itself. Many attacks began with previously stolen browser sessions, meaning compromise often occurred without new malware being deployed at all.
2. Malware Lifespan Increased Significantly
Unlike earlier years where malware campaigns burned out quickly, many 2025 malware strains operated for weeks or months inside networks before detection. Stealth and persistence mattered more than rapid impact.
3. Malware Rarely Acted Alone
Most infections involved multiple malware families working in sequence—a loader, followed by an infostealer, and later a remote access tool. Single-payload attacks became uncommon.
4. Legitimate Tools Were Weaponized at Scale
Threat actors increasingly relied on legitimate software and frameworks to blend in. Malware activity often appeared as normal administrative behavior, reducing the effectiveness of signature-based detection.
5. Cloud and Browser Data Was a Prime Target
Attackers focused heavily on:
- Browser-stored credentials
- Cloud authentication tokens
- SaaS session cookies
This allowed account takeover without exploiting infrastructure directly.
6. Email Was Still the Most Reliable Delivery Channel
Despite years of awareness training, email remained the top malware delivery vector in 2025—especially for infostealers and RATs embedded in archives or HTML attachments.
7. Malware Monetization Shifted Away from Immediate Damage
Rather than causing instant disruption, attackers preferred long-term monetization through access resale, credential marketplaces, and downstream exploitation by other threat actors.
8. Smaller Organizations Were Disproportionately Impacted
SMBs and mid-sized enterprises experienced higher infection rates than large enterprises, largely due to:
- Limited endpoint visibility
- Fewer security controls
- Slower patch cycles
9. macOS and Cross-Platform Malware Increased
While Windows remained dominant, 2025 saw a notable rise in macOS-targeted malware and cross-platform loaders, reflecting changing enterprise device usage.
10. Detection Lag Was a Major Risk Factor
Many organizations detected malware days or weeks after initial compromise, often during unrelated investigations. Early-stage malware activity frequently went unnoticed.
11. Malware Operations Became Commercialized
Malware development, hosting, and distribution increasingly followed Malware-as-a-Service models, lowering the barrier to entry for new threat actors.
12. Initial Compromise Was Often “Low Noise”
Many 2025 malware infections generated no obvious alerts. Attacks succeeded because they avoided crashes, encryption, or visible user impact.
The defining trait of malware in 2025 was not sophistication alone, but patience—attacks succeeded by staying invisible, harvesting access quietly, and monetizing over time.
Conclusion
The malware activity of 2025 made one reality clear: most breaches were decided long before organizations realized they were under attack. Infostealers, loaders, and remote access tools quietly shaped the attack landscape by eroding trust, compromising identities, and extending attacker dwell time. Defenders who focused solely on high-impact events often missed the early warning signs embedded in routine activity. As we move forward, effective defense will depend on visibility into initial compromise, identity misuse, and subtle persistence mechanisms—not just on responding to the final stage of an attack.


